This paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if the investors have heterogenous preferences implying heterogenous bargaining behavior, and if these preferences are private information. In the hold-up problem, incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of the investments to be shared by bargaining. Fair-minded individuals reject positive but unfair offers even if this causes a bargaining breakdown. As a bargaining opponent takes this into account, appearing to be fair-minded increases an investor's bargaining power. If preferences are private information, investments signal preferences. The paper derives the conditions under which there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all types of investor invest efficiently in order not to reveal information about his type unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining. Classification: C70, D23, D63, D82, J33, K12, L22 
Introduction
The study of incentive problems caused by asymmetric information has generated important and interesting insights into the functioning of institutions. As one of the main conclusions contracts designed to minimize efficiency losses should be 'complete' in the sense of using all relevant and contractible information. 1 According to this definition contracts in the real world are often highly incomplete. Surprisingly these incomplete contracts work reasonably well. Does this observation contradict incentive theory? The present paper argues that the answer to this question is 'No' if social preferences and -equally important -incomplete information about an individual's preferences are taken into account. If preferences are unobservable and information about the latter influences strategic behavior, individuals might optimally choose certain -efficient -actions in order not to reveal unfavorable information.
However, adding asymmetric information can generate new inefficiencies.
The hold-up problem -first developed by Grout (1982) , Grossman and Hart (1986) , and Hart and Moore (1990) -is the traditional tool for investigating the efficiency of incomplete contracts. In a simplified version consider a buyer and a seller who can trade one unit of a good. The good's quality is determined by a costly investment of the seller. This investment is relation-specific and increases only this particular buyer's value from purchasing the good.
Suppose the contract governing the traders' relationship is incomplete so that the buyer can renegotiate terms of trade once the seller has sunk his investment. The seller knows that the buyer will exploit the situation and thus anticipates that he cannot reap all proceeds from his investment. Consequently he reduces his effort and provides a good of inefficiently low quality. This constitutes the hold-up problem. However, in reality incomplete contracts do not always have such inefficient consequences: the buyer often pays the promised price, and trusting in this the seller provides good quality.
The present paper offers an explanation based on the following three assumptions. First, individuals differ in some characteristics affecting their bargaining behavior. Second, these heterogeneous characteristics are unobservable. And thirdly, individuals are aware of the above and account for it when determining their own bargaining behavior.
All three assumptions are confirmed by numerous experiments investigating simple bargaining games, and they form the basic ingredients of an enormous and influential literature on bargaining under incomplete information including such pioneering articles include Crawford (1982) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) . Yet the most prominent bargaining experiment, the famous 'ultimatum game', has received enormous attention for an additional reason. Apart from providing supplementary empirical evidence for the above assumption, it seems to refute the standard economic paradigm that all individuals exclusively care for their own payoff. 2
Amongst other experiments the ultimatum game has thus prompted the development of a new branch of economics. The associated theories, termed behavioral economics in a broader context, aim at a better understanding of the motivations underlying individual conduct.
The present paper directly draws upon this literature for motivating the heterogeneity in the traders' bargaining behavior.
The present paper does not build on any particular behavioral theory, but assumes preferences that can be based on reciprocity, heterogenous back-down costs and commitment, or very strong inequity aversion. Key is only, that individuals differ in their bargaining behavior, and that the preferences causing this heterogeneity are private information. There are two types, labelled fair-minded and selfish. There are the following results. Fair-minded sellers reject proposals that result in inequitable distributions. As they do so even if this causes a bargaining breakdown they bargain more aggressively than selfish sellers. If preferences are observable, the other negotiant -in the present model the buyer -accounts for this and fair-minded sellers get a higher share of the trade surplus. Thus, they have better investment
incentives. Yet since not even fair-minded sellers get the entire trade surplus, they still under-invest. Investment incentives for selfish sellers are unchanged.
However, the key argument of the model stems from an interaction of fairness and incomplete information about an individual's preferences. If preferences are unobservable, the implications of fairness change. Since in the hold-up problem bargaining is preceded by the investment, the latter might signal the seller's preferences. Depending on the considered perfect Bayesian equilibrium, both fair-minded and selfish sellers might optimally choose a certain investment in order not to 'reveal' unfavorable information about their preferences, thus harming them in the ensuing bargaining. If the efficient investment can be supported as the equilibrium choice in such a pooling equilibrium, investment incentives are efficient for both types.
Even though no scientific argument, the idea of the model is nicely illustrated by the following little anecdote from the author's personal experience. After moving into his new house, a buyer commissioned a mason to embellish his entrance area. Since work was mostly carried out on Sundays and this is usually illicit in Germany, there was probably no legal contract so that taxes can be avoided. After the entrance had been completed the buyer refused to pay anything. 3 As the mason had no possibility to take legal action without revealing the illegal nature of his work, the story so far is in nice accordance with the standard hold-up problem.
However, the mason's reaction is note-worthy and fits well into the present model. During a particulary dark night he emptied buckets full of concrete on the newly paved doorsteps.
This criminal act was clearly costly even ignoring the risk of potential legal consequences.
Thus, his behavior confirms that some people react strongly whenever they feel cheated. Yet, even more interesting than the story itself is how it was spread. The mason in person circulated the news amongst his colleagues and customers. Perhaps he tried to build up some reputation for being a 'tough' guy, but this in turn would suggest that individuals have a strategic interest in transmitting certain information about their type.
Several other paper look at the impact of incomplete information or social preferences on the efficiency of incomplete contracts. Gul (2001) investigates the hold-up problem if the buyer's investment and thus his valuation is private information. Moreover, the seller makes all offers in a bargaining game with infinite horizon. By an argument similar to the Coase conjecture, the buyer invests efficiently and the good is traded immediately if time between 3 No, the author is not the buyer.
offers converges to zero. However, inefficiencies disappear only in the limit, and psychology or fairness play no role.
The following articles are more closely related in as far as they analyze the interaction of inequity aversion or fairness and incomplete contracts. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2001) argue that since complete contracts restrict reciprocal behavior, they might crowd out reciprocal incentives. In Englmaier and Wambach (2003) Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt (2003) look at the impact of inequity aversion on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. However, none of the above models captures the idea that investments might signal a trader's preferences, and that traders might invest efficiently in order not to appear to be selfish and thus loose bargaining power in the ensuing division of the trade surplus. 
Quality and Value of the Good
Assumption 2 φ and ψ are strictly increasing.
Assumption 3 φ and ψ are strictly concave.
Assumption 4 φ and ψ are twice differentiable.
Assumption 5 φ (i) > ψ (i) and for all i.
Assumption 6 ψ (0) > 1 and lim i→∞ φ (i) < 1.
These assumptions directly imply Lemma 1. All formal proofs are to be found in the appendix. Conditional on the expected bargaining outcome, the seller's preferences take on the form
. Assumptions 1 to 6 make the seller's maximization problem well behaved in the sense of Lemma 1.
Preferences, Types, and Information
Experimental investigations of the ultimatum game exhibit the following behavioral patterns.
First, some responders reject strictly positive proposals. Second, responders are heterogeneous, some reject proposals accepted by others. Finally, bargaining breakdowns occur, which suggests that the minimum proposal a particular responder just accepts seems to be unobservable to the proposer. The following preferences generate exactly such bargaining behavior, where the internal motivations captured in the preferences will be discussed once the implied bargaining behavior has been characterized.
Depending on the good's quality i, the buyer's proposal p, and the seller's acceptance decision a, the buyer's payoff is defined as
In case of trade the buyer is exclusively interested in his share of the trade surplus. If the good is not traded, he receives a payoff normalized at zero.
In order to capture the heterogeneity of responder behavior, the seller can be either selfish or fair-minded. Let θ denote the seller's type, where θ = s indicates that the seller is selfish, and θ = f indicates that he is fair-minded. In order to allow for equilibrium bargaining breakdowns, the seller's type is taken to be private information and thus not observable to the buyer. However, it is common knowledge that the ex-ante probability for the seller to be
Depending on the good's quality i, the proposal p, and the acceptance decision a, let
denote a fair-minded seller's payoff for some parameter γ ∈]0, 1[.
Bargaining Behavior and Interpretation of Preferences
The seller's preferences have the following implications for his equilibrium bargaining behavior. For given investment i, it is optimal for a seller of type θ to accept proposal p only if 
if and only if p ≥ γ, it is optimal for the fair-minded seller to accept.
Note that both types of seller strictly prefer to accept a proposal p = γ, but that the selfish seller is indifferent between accepting and rejecting p = 0. Thus, p ≥ 0 is necessary but not sufficient to make the selfish seller always accept. As will be seen, the discontinuity of the fair-minded seller's preferences at p = γ will play a crucial role.
The above preferences thus generate exactly the responder behavior observed in the ultimatum game. Although the exact motivation for this behavior is irrelevant for the present model's results, the following interpretations are possible. First, the fair-minded seller's behavior could be driven by reciprocityà la Rabin (1993) . The fair-minded seller considers proposals offering less than share γ of the trade surplus an unfriendly act. As reciprocal reaction, he rejects such a proposal, thus harming both himself and the buyer. Second, all sellers would like to strengthen their bargaining power by ex-ante announcing to reject all proposals below some threshold γ. In the spirit of Crawford (1982) , sellers could differ with respect to their back-down costs if the buyer nevertheless proposes p < γ and the seller accepts despite his prior announcement. Finally, a fair-minded seller can be viewed as inequity averse in the spirit Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , where the suffering is infinitely strong whenever his share of the trade surplus is less than the fair or equitable share γ. 
Strategies and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
As the bargaining behavior of a selfish and a fair-minded seller differ for p < γ, the buyer might like to condition his proposal on the seller's type. As the seller's type is unobserv- Let C(i, µ) denote the continuation game -the bargaining game starting after the seller's investment i. A PBE then has the following properties. First, in every continuation game
, the buyer's equilibrium strategy p * b and the seller's equilibrium acceptance rule a * θ are mutually optimal given equilibrium belief µ * (i). In addition, the seller's acceptance rule is to comply with the spirit of subgame-perfection. Second, the buyer's belief µ * (i) is formed according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. If investment i is never chosen in equilibrium making Bayes' rule not applicable, the equilibrium belief µ * (i) may be set freely. Finally, the seller's equilibrium investment i * θ for both θ ∈ {f, s} is optimal conditional on the anticipated equilibrium play in every continuation game
b denote the equilibrium utility of the selfish seller, the fair-minded seller, and the buyer, respectively.
Since only pure strategies are considered, only pooling and separating equilibria exist. In a pooling equilibrium both types of seller choose the same equilibrium investment, i * s = i * f = i * . As there is no updating of beliefs on the equilibrium path, µ * (i * ) = π, the buyer's prior belief π determines equilibrium payoffs U * θ . In a separating equilibrium both types of seller choose different equilibrium investments, i * s = i * f . They thus reveal their type, µ * (i * s ) = 0 and µ * (i * f ) = 1.
Incomplete Information and Investment Incentives Equilibrium Play in the Continuation Game
Building on Lemma 2, equilibrium behavior in any continuation game C(i, µ) can be characterized as follows. 
If µ = γ, equilibrium play can resemble both of the above characterizations.
Two alternatives are potentially optimal for the buyer. Either, he claims a relatively small share of the trade surplus, p = γ, and trades with certainty. Or he claims the entire trade surplus, p = 0, but trades only if the seller is selfish. As the probability of trade is µ in the latter case, this belief determines which of the above alternatives is optimal. The buyer es-sentially bargains aggressively if and only if he is sufficiently convinced that the seller is selfish.
Especially important will be the maximum payoff which the seller can get if the buyer believes him to be selfish with certainty. Define this payoff as
with corresponding maximizer i 0 . Both U 0 and i 0 are strictly positive by Lemma 1.
Complete Information Benchmark
To disentangle the impact of fairness and unobservable preferences, this section analyzes the efficiency of incomplete contracts, if the seller can be fair-minded or selfish and his preferences 
forms a non-empty, bounded, and closed interval
the set of pooling equilibria can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 (Pooling Equilibria)
Suppose π ≥ γ. Then there exists a continuum of pooling equilibria in which both types
of seller invest i * ∈ I and the good is always traded.
Suppose π < γ. Then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which both types of seller invest i * = i 0 and the good is traded if and only if the seller is selfish.
Although the investment choice is continuous, the buyer's equilibrium beliefs create a discontinuity in the seller's objective function. If the seller chooses an investment just marginally lower than the equilibrium investment, the buyer's belief changes. This affects the accepted proposal and thus causes a payoff jump. This discontinuity is created by the interplay between heterogenous bargaining behavior and incomplete information about preferences.
Separating Equilibria
Although the preferences of the selfish and the fair-minded seller are very similar, they are not identical whenever the buyer proposes p smaller than γ and the seller accepts. Consequently, there exist separating equilibria, and the signalling through the investment choice is no cheap talk. However, due to the following lemma the set of separating equilibria is very degenerate, and included here more for the sake of completing the analysis.
Lemma 5 In every PBE, both types of seller get the same equilibrium utility, U
Each type of seller can get the other typ's equilibrium payoff by mimicking the investment and then optimizing over the acceptance decision. In a separating equilibria both types of seller must thus be indifferent between their and the other type's equilibrium investment.
As both reveal their type in equilibrium, the buyer proposes p * b (i * s ) = 0 after observing the selfish seller's equilibrium investment. As the selfish seller can get no worse proposal when deviating, his equilibrium investment must be i 0 maximizing ψ(i) − i. Lemma 5 then implies
Proposition 3 (Separating Equilibria) There exist two separating equilibria in which the selfish seller invests
i * s = i 0 , the fair-minded seller invests i * f ∈ { i ,
ī } as defined in Lemma 4, and the good is always traded.
In these equilibria, the buyer believes the seller to be selfish with certainty whenever observing any investment other than the fair-minded seller's equilibrium investment i * f . When deviating, the fair-minded seller thus faces the proposal p * b (i) = 0. He rejects, and consequently gets a deviation payoff of ψ(i) − i. Even though he can optimally adjust his deviation investment i to the expected proposal, he can get no more than his equilibrium utility by construction.
If the selfish seller mimics the fair-minded seller's equilibrium investment i * f , he can falsely convince the buyer that he is fair-minded. But even though he thereby gets the larger share γ of the trade surplus, he has to choose the relatively unprofitable investment i * , which is either very low, thus generating a low trade surplus, or very high, thus causing very high investment costs. This prevents deviations by the selfish seller. Figure 1 . Thus, the unique equilibrium investments are i f for the fair-minded, and i 0 for the selfish seller. If the seller's type is unobservable, his payoff depends on the buyer's belief when investing i. In the considered example, the prior belief π is sufficiently high as to induce the buyer to make the generous proposal γ whenever he does not learn anything about the seller's type. In a pooling equilibrium, both types of seller thus get an equilibrium payoff lying on the upper curve. As this equilibrium payoff must exceed the maximum deviation payoff is U 0 , all investments lying in the interval [A, B] can be supported in a pooling equilibrium.
Graphical Illustration
Investment i * provides a, particularly inefficient, example. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that there also exist two separating equilibria, in which the selfish seller always invests i 0 and the fair-minded seller invests either A or B.
Incomplete Information and Efficiency
As in most dynamic games with incomplete information, there are multiple equilibria. As with most bargaining games under incomplete information, the game form strongly influences equilibrium behavior. The quality of the results should be unaffected as long as both types of seller receive some rent in equilibrium, a rent they can loose by appearing to be of a certain type. Incorporating two-sided investments by buyer and seller should thus cause no problems as long as a suitable bargaining game is considered in which both traders get a rent by appearing to be of a certain type.
The multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria does not admit unique empirical predictions.
There is little hope that other refinements can improve the situation. However, this apparent weakness makes the model consistent with the empirical evidence that efficiency problems caused by incomplete contracts are not always equally severe. Furthermore, the model does not argue that incomplete contracts are efficient, nor does it recommend that contracts should be voluntarily left incomplete. Yet it explains why the consequences of contractual incompleteness are not necessarily catastrophic if buyer and seller might be fair-minded and -equally important -preferences are private information. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
As the seller's type is observable, the buyer holds belief µ * (i) = 0 if the selfish seller, and 
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: a) Since γ > 0 and
holds for all i. Therefore, I includes i 0 and is thus non-empty. the latter function goes to minus infinity as i goes to plus infinity. By its monotonicity, the mean value theorem thus implies the existence of a unique and finiteī. e) Asī is finite, I is bounded. As the boundaries are included, it is closed.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 a) Consider a pooling equilibrium with equilibrium investment i * . Since there is pooling, the buyer holds belief µ * (i * ) = π.
b) By Lemma 3, the buyer's most discouraging equilibrium belief to any out-of-equilibrium investment i is µ * (i) = 0, thereby giving both types of seller a deviation payoff ψ(i) − i. The supremum deviation utility is thus U 0 , which is attainable if and only if i * = i 0 . As otherwise there must exist a profitable deviation, U * θ ≥ U 0 for θ ∈ {s, f } must hold. This condition is also sufficient since, out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be chosen arbitrarily. Thus, there exists a pooling equilibrium if and only if U * θ ≥ U 0 for θ ∈ {s, f }. e) The proof of Lemma 4 implies existence of investmentsī or i, and thus the existence of the above characterized separating equilibria for all π.
Q.E.D.
